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Decomposing wages into worker and rm wage components, we
nd that rm-xed components (rm rents) are sizeable parts of work-
ers' wages. If workers can only imperfectly observe the extent of rm
rents in their wages, they might be mislead about the overall wage
distribution. Such misperceptions may lead to unjustied high reser-
vation wages, resulting in overly long unemployment durations. We
examine the inuence of previous wages on unemployment durations
for workers after exogenous lay-os and, using Austrian administrative
data, we nd that younger workers are, in fact, unemployed longer if
they proted from high rm rents in the past. We interpret our nd-
ings as evidence for overcondence generated by imperfectly observed
productivity.
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Job search theory oers a framework to explain the duration of unemploy-
ment spells. In this framework, unemployed workers search sequentially for
a job. If job oers arrive at random and the distribution of oers is known,
it is optimal for the searcher to accept the rst oer which is at or above
the reservation wage. This strategy balances search costs and expected gains
from further search.
Knowing or learning about the distribution of wage oers is a non-trivial
task for job-seekers. While the job searcher is learning over time | updating
prior beliefs with recently sampled job oers | the choice of an initial prior
is important.1 A job searcher may use his or her past wage as a prior for the
wage oer distribution. If the past wage equals the worker's productivity, it
will be a perfect starting point. If, however, the wage was greater than the
worker's productivity, e.g., because of seniority wages, this may result in an
overly high reservation wage due to a distorted perception of the worker's
productivity. In consequence, the overly high reservation wage will result in
the rejection of wage oers the worker would have accepted had the reser-
vation wage been based on the correct wage distribution. Empirically, this
will translate into relatively longer unemployment durations, which are being
determined by how quickly the searcher updates his or her prior of the wage
1In special situations, e.g., if the searcher's prior beliefs follow a Dirichlet distribution
and the searcher is updating her priors according to Bayes' rule, this does not matter:
even if the wage oer distribution is unknown, the qualitative properties of optimal search
strategies remain the same (Rothschild, 1974). But as Rothschild (1974) points out, \(the
results) are still quite special, as the proofs depend on the process of revising beliefs
to accommodate new information having a particular|and not terribly natural|local
property" (p. 694).
1oer distribution.2
We study workers who exogenously lost their jobs due to plant closures
and analyze their unemployment durations. A random sample of unemployed
workers would be problematic for two reasons: workers dismissed for a cause
might be negatively selected and, more importantly, workers who quit their
job voluntarily typically do so because they are looking for a better(-paid)
job. These workers will bias the analysis. Using unemployed workers from
plant closures solves this problem, because plant closures hit all workers alike.
Because wages may contain components which are not related to a
worker's productivity, such as rents, seniority pay or eciency wage compo-
nents, we decompose past wages into worker-specic, human-capital specic
and rm-specic components. The decomposition separates wage compo-
nents which reect a worker's productivity, including unobservable produc-
tivity components (xed eects), from a rm-specic part of the wage. The
rm-specic component | we use the term \rent" from now on | are nor-
malized to reect deviations from the industry average. Our data cover all
Austrian workers for more than three decades, which allows us to reliably de-
compose the last wage before the plant closures and to study the unemployed
workers' subsequent labor market spells. Using the same decomposition pro-
cedure, Gruetter and Lalive (2009) show that rm xed eects indeed play
an important role in the wage determination in Austria. Their estimates
suggest that around 27% of total variation in wages can be explained by
2Winter-Ebmer (1998) studies the relation between the wage distribution in the last
rm and unemployment durations and nds that average wages have no association with
unemployment durations, while other parameters of the wage distribution, e.g., inequality
in the old rm, do.
2unobserved rm eects, i.e. rm rents.
These considerations are related to recent discussions in behavioral eco-
nomics about overcondence (Della Vigna, 2007). Workers who judge their
productivity correctly will base their expectations of the wage oer distribu-
tion only on those parts of the wage which reect their productivity. Over-
condent workers might mistake (parts of) the rm rent for their own pro-
ductivity and attribute the rm rent to their own eort and ability. While
there is eld evidence on overcondence in e.g., trading patterns of individ-
uals (Barber and Odean, 2001) or in CEO behavior (Malmendier and Tate,
2005), there is little direct evidence on labor market or search behavior. Hoch
(1985) found that MBA students overestimate the number of job oers they
will receive and the magnitude of their salary.3
Our analysis is also relevant for the discussion of the employment pat-
terns of older workers. For example, Saint-Paul (2009) argues that Con-
tinental European labor markets are rigid, especially because of age- and
tenure-related wage schedules, and in addition to earnings-related (Bismarck-
ian) welfare state benets, older workers might easily become too expensive,
given their productivity. If older workers receive wages that are in excess of
their productivity due to seniority-based wages and they, on becoming un-
employed, mistakenly assume that such wages reect their true productivity,
they will have reservation wages that are too high and end up with long un-
employment durations. Our analysis can shed some light on this discussion.
3Dubra (2004) assumes in a theoretical model that searchers are overcondent and
explores search behavior and corresponding welfare eects. There is also a larger experi-
mental literature on bargaining behavior, e.g., Babcock and Loewenstein (1997).
3We nd that only young workers can be described as overcondent.
Workers who previously had a high rm rent tend to search longer for a
new job than those who had a low rm rent. They presumably expect to
nd high-paying jobs and turn down more realistic job oers at the start of
their unemployment spells. We explore that the pattern might be caused by
misconceptions of the true wage distribution, e.g., because workers have not
been actively searching for new employment in the past. Our analyses along
such lines suggest that overcondence is the more probable explanation for
the relatively longer unemployment durations of workers who had high rm
rents. In addition, we do not nd evidence that older workers remain un-
employed because they systematically misjudge potential wages, given their
productivity.
2 Empirical Strategy
We model unemployment durations with proportional discrete time hazard
rate models. We use the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model, augmented
with a discrete mixture distribution to account for unobserved individual
heterogeneity, as proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984).4
Suppose there are i = 1;:::;N workers who become unemployed at time
t = 0 and are observed for s time periods. At each point in time, the worker
either remains unemployed or nds new employment. The discrete hazard
4We use Jenkins' (2004) Stata module to estimate the hazard models.
4rate in period t is (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978):
ht = 1   exp( exp(0 + Xit)); (1)
where 0 is an intercept and the linear index function, Xit, incorporates the
impact of the covariates. (See also Jenkins (1995).) Workers who leave the
sample for other reasons, e.g., retiring, are treated as censored.
Suppose that each worker belongs to a group of an unobserved type,
e.g., low or high ability in obtaining a job. This can be parameterized by
allowing the intercept term 0 to dier across types (Heckman and Singer,
1984). In a model with types z = 1;:::;Z, the hazard function for worker
belonging to type z is:
hz;t = 1   exp( exp(mz + 0 + Xit)); (2)
and the probability of belonging to type z is pz. The mz are the mass
points of a multinomial distribution where m1 is normalized to equal zero
and p1 = 1  
Pz=Z
z=2 pz. The z-th mass point equals mz + 0.
This econometric specication allows for time-varying covariates and to
investigate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for leaving unem-
ployment. The vector of characteristics, Xit, includes time-invariant char-
acteristics, e.g., the rm size at the start of the unemployment spell, and
time-varying characteristics, such as e.g., the benet replacement rate of
the unemployed. In addition to these (standard) controls, we also control
for whether the worker enjoyed above-average rm rents or not, estimated
5from a decomposition of the wages. We expect that workers who had received
above-average rm rents to remain unemployed longer, all other things equal.
3 Data
We use linked employer-employee data from the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD) which contains detailed information on all workers cov-
ered by the Austrian social security system from 1972 to 2009.5 Because of
strong seasonality in employment (Del Bono and Weber, 2008), we exclude
construction and tourism workers. We also limit our sample to workers with
a minimum tenure of six weeks in the last rm.
Typically, a sample of job searchers is composed of workers who were
red in their old job due to inadequate performance, workers who were red
due to labor demand volatility and workers who quit voluntarily. Both work-
ers red for cause and those quitting voluntarily pose a problem for an analy-
sis of wage expectations, because their separation from the rm is an endoge-
nous event. We therefore concentrate on workers from plant closures where
the cause of unemployment is an exogenous event. Our sample consists of
workers who were laid o due to plant closures between 1990 and 1996 and
who were between 20 and 55 (50 for females) years of age at that time.
Plant closures are not directly observed in the data, but identied indi-
rectly by the disappearance of a rm's identier. To ensure these disappear-
ances are true plant closures, and not merely caused by e.g., administrative
5See Zweim uller et al. (2009) for a description of the data.
6recoding, we dene rms as closing rms only if one of the following require-
ments is fullled. First, the majority of workers is not immediately employed
after the disappearance of the identier, (2) the majority of workers is em-
ployed in a single rm with a dierent identier, but the workers account for
less than 50% of the new rm's workforce, or (3) the majority of workers is
spread out over dierent rms.
In total, we observe 28,078 female and 37,432 male workers being laid
o from 31,704 closing rms within 60 days before plant closure.6 From
these, we exclude workers for whom we cannot decompose the wages, which
reduces our estimating sample to 24,424 female and 34,746 male workers in
30,192 closing rms.7 The unemployment duration is the number of days
starting from the day the worker is laid o until the worker starts a new
job. Unemployment spells that last longer than 1,500 days are censored.
Spells that end with death, self employment, maternity leave, or subsidized
employment and sick leave lasting for more than 6 months are also censored.
3.1 Decomposition of wages
Following Gruetter and Lalive (2009) we derive our proxy for the distortion
of the reservation wage by decomposing wages into worker-specic, human-
capital specic and rm-specic components. For this we use the universe of
all blue-collar workers for the years 1980 to 2000 (and not only our sample of
6To check for robustness, we follow Schwerdt (2008) and also sample early leavers:
workers who were laid o up to 180 days before plant closure. See below.
7Notice that rm-xed components in the wages are only identied if we observe at
least one worker moving in or out of a rm. Similarly, worker-xed components are only
identied for workers who are observed in at least two dierent rms.
7workers who worked in rms that closed down). These are 3,818,508 workers
in 459,144 rms after deleting observations where we cannot identify the
wage components. (Summary statistics of the sample that we use for the
decomposition of the wages are shown in the Appendix, Table 8.)















E [itji;j;t;Xijt] = 0: (4)
The parameter j in equation (3) gives the dierence in earnings in rm
j = 1;:::;J, relative to the average rm. This is our indicator of rm rents
as it indicates a relatively low or high wage in the past job, controlling for
observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity. The parameter i captures
all (unobserved) time-invariant dierences between workers and may be seen
as a proxy for ability. The parameter vector  captures economy wide returns
to productivity and experience for the time-varying characteristics of worker
i in rm j at time t, Xijt.8
It is important to stress that the identifying assumption behind equa-
8We use Ouazad's (2008) Stata module. Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap-
ping. Detailed estimation results are shown in the appendix.
8tion (4) requires the error term to be independent of any observable eects in
Xijt, the person-xed component i or the rm-xed component j. In other
words, it assumes exogenous mobility. If there is positive assortative match-
ing, i.e., good rms employ good workers, then the correlation between i and
j should be positive (and large).9 Here, in contrast, we nd that rm and
worker xed components are weakly negatively correlated, the correlations
are -0.01 for male and -0.006 for female workers. However, Abowd et al.
(2004) caution that the mere examination of the correlation between per-
son and rm components is not sucient to provide evidence for or against
sorting in the labor market. We therefore follow De Melo (2008) and ad-
ditionally calculate the correlation between a worker's xed component, i,
and the mean of the co-workers' xed components,   i. This correlation is
small, corr(i;   i) = 0:095, and indicates that there is little sorting in our
data.10
Because we normalize the rm rent to reect deviations from the indus-
try average, we characterize workers by whether they worked in rms that
paid above the average, \high-rent rms", and those that paid below the
average. Table 1 tabulates summary statistics of our sample of unemployed
workers, dividing the sample into persons coming from rms with below and
above average rm rents. 54% of the men who became unemployed after a
plant closure had below average rm rents. In contrast, 71% of women had
below average rents. Workers who received low rents had on average lower
9Shimer (2005) shows that a model with coordination frictions may lead to positive
but imperfect correlation between workers' productivity and rms' types. Abowd et al.
(2004), in a simulation of Shimer's (2005) results, obtain a negative correlation between
person and rm components.
10We bootstrap the correlation using 50 replications.
9wages than those with high rents, the dierence in means was greater for
men (about e14/day) than for women (e10/day). Consistent with our ar-
guments above, we observe longer unemployment durations with high rents
than for those with low rents if we consider male workers - 128 vs. 117 days.
For women, however, the mean duration of 123 days for high rent workers is
slightly shorter than for low rent workers (126).
Although post-unemployed wages were on average higher for high rent
workers than for low rent workers, we see that high rent workers experienced
a relative wage loss and low rent workers a relative wage gain. High rent
workers were slightly older than workers coming from low rent rms, and
they had on average shorter tenures.
Table 2 tabulates mean unemployment durations for dierent groups of
workers in more detail. Overall, men were unemployed for some 121 days
and women for about 127 days. On average, workers with a low person-xed
component remain unemployed much longer than those with a high person-
xed component, 135 vs. 107 days for men and 135 vs. 112 days for women.
This is consistent with interpreting the person-xed component as an indi-
cator of ability where workers who are more adept in the workplace are also
more skilled in obtaining new employment. We also see that unemployment
durations are on average longer for older workers.
If our decomposition of wages is valid, rm rents are random and work-
ers who worked in high-rent rms should lose the rent, and vice versa. This
is, in fact, what we nd. For both males and females, workers who worked in
low-rent rms have on average higher wages in their new jobs, and workers
10from high-rent rms have lower wages in their new jobs. Figure 1 looks at this
pattern in more detail. For each elapsed unemployment duration, we plot the
average wage change between the old and new job, distinguishing between
workers who earlier had worked in low-rent or high-rent rms. Workers who
had enjoyed positive rm-rents in the past clearly have lower wages in their
new jobs, independent of elapsed unemployment duration. In contrast, work-
ers who had worked in low-rent rms experience wage increases at shorter
unemployment durations. For longer unemployment durations, they also ex-
perience a wage loss, however, this is less pronounced than for workers who
had worked in high-rent rms.11 Overall, workers who remain unemployed
longer than about 20 weeks face a negative trend in wages, which is probably
a combination of selection and stigma eects.
Figure 2 indicates that the convergence in wages is, in fact, driven by a
convergence in rm rents. We see large increases in rm rents | up to 25%
| for workers who had worked in low-rent rms and losses of about 10%
for those from high-rent rms. These patterns are conrming once more the
validity of the wage decomposition procedure.
4 Results
We present results from non-parametric discrete-time hazard rate models,
estimated separately for men and women, in Table 3. The explanatory vari-
ables in all specications include the replacement rate, the worker's age at
11Due to smaller sample sizes at longer unemployment durations, the condence intervals
are large at durations longer than 30 weeks.
11the time of plant closure, the (old) rm's size at the time of plant closure, and
indicator variables for year, industry and region. The specication presented
in columns (1) and (4) does not contain the wage components and serves as
a benchmark for our specications below. The estimates indicate that the
higher the replacement rate, the lower the hazard of nding employment, a
nding that is consistent with previous research on unemployment durations
(e.g., Meyer, 1990). Older workers search somewhat longer than younger
workers.
The specication in columns (2) and (5) augments the benchmark spec-
ication with the estimated rm- and person-xed wage components which
are introduced as dummy variables indicating below or above average values.
Workers who had high rm rents in their previous employment have lower
hazard rates, indicating that they search longer than comparable workers
who had low rm rents. The result holds both for men and women; however,
for women, the coecient is not statistically signicant at conventional lev-
els. The resulting longer unemployment durations for workers from high-rent
rms are compatible with our hypothesis that these workers base their wage
expectations not only on their person-specic component, but also on the
rm rent.
These workers could be characterized as being overcondent of their
own abilities and productivity. In other words, they appear to attribute the
wage they earned in the past rm largely towards their own capabilities and
disregard the randomness which might have played a role in the rent they
enjoyed in the last rm. In addition, we nd that individuals with high
12person-specic components leave unemployment earlier, in particular men.
This variable is a proxy for xed personal traits, such as ability, productivity
or work eort, and the positive association with the hazard rate is therefore
to be expected.
The specication in columns (3) and (6) additionally controls for unob-
served heterogeneity in the search process by estimating two mass points for
the distribution of abilities.12 In addition to heterogeneity captured by the
xed person eects, which indicate dierences in unobserved productivity,
the mass points control for unspecic dierences in job nding (and accept-
ing) probabilities. It turns out that the inclusion of mass points does not
change our estimated estimated coecients to a large extent. The only ex-
ception is the coecient for the high rm component for females, which is
now more precisely estimated. Interestingly, the estimates imply only mi-
nor dierences for male and female workers, and especially the associations
between high rents and the hazard rate are virtually identical.
4.1 Age dierences
Results from the psychological literature suggests that older adults have
greater insight into the limitations of their knowledge than younger ones
(Musi elak et al., 2006; Pliske and Mutter, 1996); in other words, overcon-
dence might be related to age and the associated dierences in postformal
cognitive development (Pliske and Mutter, 1996).
12When we include more than two mass points, all additional mass points are not sta-
tistically signicant at conventional levels.
13We split our population into young, prime-age and old workers. The
results are tabulated in Table 4 using the comprehensive specication with
mass points. While all other coecients|in particular the person xed eect
and the benet replacement rate|have almost exactly the same inuence
across age groups, the eect of the rm rent diers across age groups. Only
for workers below the age of 30 we nd a negative and signicant eect of
high rents on the hazard of leaving unemployment. This is consistent with
other patterns of overcondence by young people as know e.g., from trac
accidents.13
More importantly perhaps, we do not see any evidence for distorted wage
expectations for prime-age workers and, in particular, for older workers. It
seems that these workers do not have excessive wage expectations which were
caused by rm rents; Saint-Paul's (2009) argument for the unemployability
of older workers due to misguided reservation wages is not supported by our
evidence.
4.2 Overcondent or inexperienced?
In our interpretations above we stressed overcondence, i.e., attributing spu-
rious wage components to one's own ability or eort, as the cause for the
dierences in unemployment durations. However, our empirical results could
also be driven by systematic errors in deriving the reservation wages, for ex-
ample, because workers with long tenures are less informed about the state
13Young drivers' higher probability of being involved in car accidents is found to be
linked to young drivers being overcondent in their own driving abilities. See e.g., Brown
(1982) and Rumar (1985).
14of the labor market than workers who have short tenures. Workers with long
tenures may not have good knowledge of the relevant wage oer distribution
and they therefore might put too much emphasis on past wages. Workers
who are new in a rm might have a better understanding of the outside op-
portunities, which they faced when they searched for the current job, and
might therefore have less distorted views about the wage oer distribution
and their own productivity. To investigate this issue, we separate our sample
into workers with short and long tenure in the previous rm.14 A tenure is
short if it lasted up to 500 days.
The results are tabulated in Table 6. For males, we do not see any
dierence between short- and long-tenured workers. Young workers do search
longer if they came from a high-rent rm, regardless of their tenure; prime-age
and old workers do not search dierently with respect to low-rent or high-
rent rms. This is strong evidence against the misconception argument. For
females, the results are similar: while we do nd rm-rent eects for young
short-tenured workers, the eect is smaller and insignicant for females with a
longer job tenure in the past. If long tenures had caused the misconception,
we would have expected the opposite result. Again, there is no eect for
prime-age or old women.
A similar test concerns the number of previous jobs, where workers who
were more exposed to realized rather than oered wages might have a more
realistic perception of the wage oer distribution. We proxy this exposure
by the number of previous jobs and dene a worker who had 5 or more
14Due to small sample sizes, we pool prime age and older workers.
15previous jobs as a \job hopper" and one with fewer than 5 previous jobs
as a \stayer". The lower panel in Table 6 reports the estimated coecients
for these groups of workers, interacted with age. Again, we obtain large
negative coecients for young male workers, regardless whether they were
stayers or hoppers, indicating that high rm rents have a distortive eect on
their wage expectations. While the coecient for stayers is somewhat higher
as compared to hoppers, the dierence is not statistically signicant. For
females, the results are similar; both young job hoppers as well as stayers
face longer unemployment durations in case of higher previous rm rents|
but the eect for stayers is statistically insignicant. Overall these tests
imply that our results are not driven by young workers' lack of job search
experience.
4.3 Are plant closures random (enough)?
Because we use workers who are remaining with the rm until the very end of
the rm, we may have a selected sample of workers who have below average
characteristics of the unemployed. (\Good" workers may have had other
opportunities and left prior to the rm's closing-down.) This aspect has
been studied with similar Austrian data by Schwerdt (2008), who suggests
that an analysis that uses plant closures to obtain an unbiased sample of the
unemployed should experiment with dierent sampling periods prior to plant
closure.
We therefore repeat the analysis including all employees who have been
laid o from the rm within six months before plant closure. Extending the
16sampling period from two to six months increases out sample size to 26,315
male and 13,363 female workers experiencing at least one day of unemploy-
ment after lay-o.
Table 5 shows that our results are remarkably stable and, again, young
males and females have signicant longer unemployment durations if they
had high rm rents. The coecients are similar in size to the ones in Table 4.
It is therefore unlikely that our result of a negative impact of high rm rents
on unemployment durations for younger workers is caused by workers who
left the plants early.
5 Conclusion
Assessing one's own productivity is important for job search and matching
in the labor market. A realistic perception of one's productivity will enable
the job search to match eciently with an employer. According to psycho-
logical research workers often attribute (excessively) high wages to their own
abilities rather than to pure luck in obtaining employment with a rm that
pays high rents. Such a distorted assessment could result in a systematic
misjudgement of the wage oer distribution a job searcher faces with corre-
sponding repercussions for the job search process.
We study job search behavior of workers who were made redundant due
to plant closures in Austria and nd that young workers can be characterized
as being overcondent: high rm rents in the past job lead to signicantly
longer unemployment durations. We do not nd such a pattern for prime-age
17or older workers. These results challenge the view that the high unemploy-
ment rates of older workers in Europe are due to excessive wage claims.
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Figure 1: Relative change in wages before and after plant closure by level of
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Figure 2: Relative change in rm rents before and after plant closure by level













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 2: Average unemployment durations (days), by gender and wage com-
ponents.
male female
mean N mean N
All 121 16574 127 10448
Low person component 135 8156 135 6914
High person component 107 8418 112 3534
Young (20-30) 113 6785 118 4460
Prime age (30-45) 117 6994 131 4609























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 6: Estimated eect of high rm rent (0/1) on the hazard rates
from unemployment to employment for male and female workers, by pre-
displacement tenure and number of pre-displacement jobs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
male female
young prime age/old young prime age/old
short tenure1 -0.146*** -0.018 -0.128*** 0.054
(0.051) (0.049) (0.062) (0.059)
long tenure1 -0.167*** 0.038 -0.051 -0.050
(0.075) (0.053) (0.075) (0.052)
hopper2 -0.136*** 0.029 -0.093* -0.005
(0.053) (0.042) (0.053) (0.044)
stayer2 -0.173*** -0.106 -0.123 -0.066
(0.072) (0.069) (0.104) (0.088)
Notes: Discrete-time proportional hazard rate models corresponding
to column (3) in Table 3. Only the coecients for high rm rent are
reported, additional variables as in Table 3. [1] A tenure is short if it
was shorter or equal to 500 days. [2] Workers with less/more than 4
dierent previous jobs are dened as stayers/hoppers. ***, ** and *
indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
28A Appendix
Table 7: Transitions after Plant Closure.
male female
status after plant closure:
job to job transition 18,172 (52.3%) 13,976 (57.3%)
unemployed after plant closure 16,574 (47.7%) 10,448 (42.7%)
transition after unemployment:
reemployed 14,998 (90%) 8,862 (85%)
retired after unemployment 185 (1%) 69 (1%)
censored 1,401(9%) 1,517 (14%)
Note: 34,746 male and 24,424 female blue-collar workers.
29Table 8: Summary statistics, decomposition sample.
Total Number of Observations 36,745,258
Total Number of Workers 3,818,508
# Males 2,333,789
Total Number of Firms 459,144
# Firms w. rmsize 10 to 100 90,158
# Firms w. rmsize 101 to 1000 7,574
# Firms w. rmsize>1000 274
Total Number of Years 21
Average age1 35.1 (11.1)
Average wage (eper day)1 41.0 (16.1)
Average tenure(years)1 9.5 (8.9)
Average experience (years)1 11.4 (6.4)
Notes: [1] Calculated for the year 1990. Standard deviation in paren-
theses.













Notes: Additional explanatory variables: year, region, in-
dustry dummies. [1] Standard errors obtained via bootstrap-
ping (20 repetitions). [2] Baseline: 0-1 years of experience.
30B Appendix B: only for referees
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